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F

ew leaders, if any, would make the decision to deploy nuclear weapons
casually. Therefore, the fact that a country possesses such arms indicates
that it has important uses for them. Nevertheless, analysts of contemporary
Chinese foreign policy often dismiss the nuclear arsenal of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as insignificant in size and passively defensive in purpose.1 Indeed, analysts of contemporary nuclear matters often fail to mention
China at all.2 This article aims to correct these omissions by arguing that
Beijing has long-term aspirations to improve its position in world politics,
and that nuclear weapons play a fundamental role in its plans.
Whenever one discusses long-term planning in foreign policy, one
must proceed with caution. Chance plays such a large role in international
politics that it is difficult for any government to plan its foreign affairs in
much detail. One must remain aware that a nation’s domestic politics can
overshadow its external intentions. The lack of reliable information about
such basic matters as the Beijing government’s defense budget makes it all
the more difficult to analyze China’s foreign policy.
With those caveats, however, one may observe that there are patterns
in China’s policies, media attitudes, and military thought. These patterns
match those which an observer would expect to see in a country with China’s
known goals and China’s known capabilities. These patterns have remained
consistent for decades. Therefore, one may infer that the Chinese government
is pursuing a coherent long-term policy, whether or not it has planned its future moves in detail.
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This article begins by discussing China’s foreign policy aspirations.
A second section covers China’s ability to achieve those aspirations, and
notes that its nuclear arsenal is its only reliable assurance of military supremacy. A third section discusses Chinese official and semi-official statements on
nuclear doctrine. Beijing professes to maintain nuclear forces only to deter
others from using nuclear weapons against it, but Chinese military writings
suggest that the PRC’s leadership understands that such arms have more uses
than that. A final section discusses the PRC’s capabilities. This section notes
that, despite American assertions that the strategic environment has changed
radically over the past 12 years, Chinese writers tend to stress the continuities
in international affairs, and Chinese military developments appear to be following the same pattern they have been following since the 1980s.

China’s Military Requirements
The PRC has ambitious foreign policy goals, many of which bring
it into conflict with other powers. To begin with, the PRC, like any selfrespecting state, treasures its sovereignty. Official spokesmen speak passionately about the humiliation China suffered at the hands of European powers
during the 19th century, and about their country’s determination never to repeat the experience. Despite the fashion for modifying the principle of national independence to accommodate international organizations and global
commerce, Chinese writers define sovereignty rigidly.3
Chinese leaders appreciate that their country needs to trade and cooperate with other nations, and that this will often require them to compromise. For this reason, they wish to obtain as much international influence as
they can, so as to settle as many disputes as possible on their own terms. In the
words of Colonel Peng Guangqian of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
“The development of modern China cannot be separated from the outside
world, especially at a time when the world is growing smaller each day.”4 Accordingly, Peng concludes that China’s development depends on a favorable
international strategic situation.
China’s leaders also understand that the dominant powers in the contemporary world are, at best, lukewarm toward their regime. Although many
observers suggest that the Chinese are relinquishing their belief in commu-
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nist ideology, China’s leaders continue to ground their political discourse in
the precepts of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Chinese political statements warn that
the capitalist nations are attempting to reduce China to vassal status. Even if
China’s leaders have privately abandoned communist ideas, they are certainly aware that, in the words of China scholar Gerald Segal, “On no single
strategic issue are China and the West on the same side.”5 This doubtless encourages them to remember Mao’s oft-quoted teaching that power grows out
of the barrel of a gun.
The PRC also is engaged in a large number of more specific disputes,
all of which motivate it to remain militarily strong. Beijing aspires to recover
Taiwan. In the South China Sea, Beijing contends with Indonesia, Thailand,
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Republic of China (ROC) for
control over various islands. The PRC also has territorial disputes with Japan.
PRC media sources sustain the idea that if Japan ever rearmed, Beijing would
view it as a rival. Meanwhile, Zhao Nanqi, the director of China’s Academy
of Military Sciences, has commented, “We are not prepared to let the Indian
Ocean become India’s ocean.”6
Beijing also wishes to be in a position to support its Pakistani allies
in their disagreements with India. The PRC government undoubtedly prizes
its ability to arbitrate in Korean disputes as well. Britain’s respected paper the
Daily Telegraph reports that China has helped to secure Sudanese oilfields
during Sudan’s civil war, and the Chinese may wish to intervene in future African conflicts as well.7 By the mid 21st century, China appears likely to face
severe shortages of food and energy. The PRC requires the means to secure its
access to fisheries and oil reserves. In a worst-case scenario, it may need to do
so by force.
The PRC’s relationship with the United States is particularly strained.
Chinese commentators note that the current Bush Administration has designated their country as a strategic competitor.8 PRC ships and aircraft have had
tense encounters with American armed forces. Chinese military officers have
proposed that the PRC needs to project power as far as Taiwan, the Ryukyus,
the Philippines, Borneo, the Marianas, Guam, and the Carolines in order to
guard its shores against overseas opponents such as America.9

China’s Military Capabilities
The PRC may not wish to settle these disputes violently, but it needs
to maintain the option of doing so, and China’s leaders cannot feel confident
that their non-nuclear forces are equal to the task. Although the various
branches of the PLA are over two million strong, its deficiencies in troop
skills, electronics, naval power, and modern aircraft make its numerical
strength misleading. Not only is the PRC ill-equipped to fight the United
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States, it possesses only marginal advantages over such rivals as Japan, India,
and the ROC.
The 1991 Gulf War provides a case study of large-scale combat under
contemporary conditions. Chinese military thinkers have investigated it thoroughly. Like many other observers, the Chinese were impressed with the way
the Western coalition used information technology to hamstring its Iraqi foes.
China’s strategists were undoubtedly disturbed by the fact that Iraq’s forces
had relied on Soviet-designed weapon systems much like the ones in the PRC’s
own arsenal. Like their counterparts in other countries, Chinese military writers explored the possibility that developments in sensors, communications
equipment, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) had paved the way for a
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which technologically adept armed
forces would possess an insuperable advantage over their opponents.
The technological capabilities that RMA theory views as being the
most important are precisely the ones that the PRC lacks. The US Department
of Defense assessed various countries’ ability to produce forms of advanced
equipment in its Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL).10 This report
rated countries’ capabilities on a scale of zero to four, with zero equaling no
known capability whatsoever, and one indicating the minimum detectable
level of proficiency. China received the following ratings:
l Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information
and Intelligence (C4I2) Systems: 1.
l High-Performance Computing: 1.
l Intelligent Systems: 1.
l Software: 1.
l Signal Processing (i.e. technologies associated with ensuring the
accuracy and reliability of data transmission in environments
with high levels of interference, including intentional countermeasures): 1.
l Transmission Systems (i.e. technologies which minimize interception and counter enemy electronic warfare): 1.
l Electronic Components: 1.
l Opto-Electronics: 1.
l Radar: 1.
Japan, by contrast, received a rating of three in all these areas, indicating that it had the “majority” of the capabilities involved. In the fields of
high-performance computing, intelligent systems, and networks and switching, Japan received a rating of four, the maximum possible. The Defense Department rated US capabilities as a four in all these categories. India faces
similar handicaps to the PRC, but the ROC’s access to American-made weapon
systems puts it on a par with Japan.
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For any country with an interest in the RMA, the lack of C4I2 systems
is devastating. The lack of signal processing and transmission equipment capable of resisting enemy electronic warfare is almost equally so. China’s deficiencies in optical and electronic systems sharply limit its ability to develop
precision-guided munitions as well. Although the PRC has achieved “pockets of excellence” in certain areas, notably cruise and ballistic missiles, its
overall technological backwardness hampers its attempts to use its more advanced weapons in concert with its other equipment. This makes it much
more difficult for PRC forces to use such weapons to achieve lasting or decisive victories, and also prevents the PLA from obtaining what many theorists
believe to be the most essential element of any RMA strategy—an integrated
“system of systems.”
Although the PRC is attempting to remedy these defects, its scientific and industrial base is poorly equipped for this challenge. “In none of the
technologies essential for the manufacture of advanced military equipment
does China rank higher than ‘some’ production capabilities”11 (a rating of two
on the MCTL scale). PRC research and manufacturing facilities are particularly limited in their ability to perform precision measurements, and this will
retard their development of both ships and aircraft. The PRC may overcome
some of its difficulties by purchasing military equipment abroad. Nevertheless, it is easy to see why the PRC military newspaper Liberation Army Daily
declared: “The strong momentum of the world’s military development undoubtedly represents a grim challenge for our units’quality building and military preparations against war.”12
Chinese analysts did not attribute the coalition’s victory over Iraq in
1991 to technology alone. Western forces also benefitted from the individual
proficiency of their soldiers, the cohesion and teamwork displayed by their
units, and the tactical abilities of their commanders. Here also, the Chinese
appear to have cause for concern. From the 1980s onward, the PRC has been
reducing the size of its armed forces in the hope that this will free the resources necessary to provide improved training, better living conditions, and
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more plentiful equipment for those who remain. The PLA’s performance in
large-scale exercises indicates that this process has been at least partly successful, but it remains incomplete, and it must be difficult even for Chinese
analysts to be certain how well their troops would perform in actual combat.13
The fact that approximately one million PLA personnel are conscripts performing two years of mandatory service raises further doubts about their degree of motivation and level of experience.14
Also limiting Beijing’s military power is the fact that most of the
PRC’s international disputes are maritime. The PRC is currently attempting
to assert its influence in the South China Sea, and may eventually wish to exert a presence in the Persian Gulf. Two of Beijing’s most prominent rivals, Japan and the ROC, are islands. Control of the Pacific Ocean would be critical
in any contest between China and the United States. Although the PRC has attacked India over the Himalayas before, such operations present obvious logistical difficulties, and Beijing would undoubtedly prefer to challenge its
South Asian rival in the Indian Ocean.
For these reasons, the PRC must measure its military power largely
in terms of its fleet. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is no longer the mere coastal defense fleet of the 1950s and 1960s. Chinese naval authorities have cultivated
a domestic shipbuilding industry and supplemented their own construction
with imports. The PLAN appears to have used its resources effectively. Nevertheless, it suffers from glaring limitations.
The PRC has imported four Kilo-class submarines from Russia, along
with two Sovremenny-class destroyers. Beijing expects to receive another two
Sovremennys in 2005, along with another eight Kilos at an unspecified future
point.15 China also appears to be attempting to build the Kilo in its own shipyards.16 Neither type of vessel is at the forefront of maritime technology, but the
Kilo is quiet enough to challenge Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems, and the Sovremenny carries the potent Sunburn anti-ship missile.
The strength of a contemporary fleet, however, lies in the ability of
its ships to protect one another with their defensive systems, and to combine
their efforts in the attack. China’s deficiencies in C4I2 systems sharply limit
the PLAN’s ability to achieve such cooperation. The fact that over half the
PRC’s major surface combatants lack surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) means
that they could not protect themselves or each other against enemy aircraft
and missiles even if they acquired the C4I2 gear.17 Moreover, much of naval
warfare revolves around attempts to detect the enemy without being detected.
China’s lack of modern sensors and electronic countermeasures hampers it in
this area as well.
Beijing has more ships than many of its opponents, but its numerical
advantages are modest. The PRC has 63 major surface combatants of uneven
Winter 2003-04
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quality.18 Japan has 54, most of which are more heavily armed and all of
which are technologically up to date. The ROC has 32 vessels, which, again,
carry modern equipment. India has 29, mainly equipped with Russian or Soviet systems, but one of India’s ships is an aircraft carrier.
Submarines are the traditional weapon of a second-rate naval power,
and China has amassed a force of 69 such vessels. The PLAN’s underwater
fleet is formidable, but it is hardly invincible. China’s domestically produced
submarines lack the anechoic tiles that give the Kilo its stealth.19 Also, over
half of China’s submarine forces consist of obsolete Romeo-class boats,
many of which may be unseaworthy.20
The PRC does have a respectable ability to move its ground forces
by sea. A study by the US Army War College suggests that the PLA could land
a full division of 10,000 to 14,000 troops in the first wave of an amphibious
invasion, and analysts believe that the PRC armed forces could move 40,000
personnel onto the beachhead in a follow-up operation.21 If the PRC used its
assets creatively, it might be able to transport even larger numbers. One must,
however, weigh the PRC’s transport capabilities against the difficulties the
PLAN would face in protecting its troopships at sea, the fact that the ROC has
prepared extensively to deal with an invasion, the fact that the PRC’s more
powerful rivals have land armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands,
and the inherent difficulties of amphibious operations.
The PRC’s combat aircraft are also superannuated, which exacerbates the problems of the PLAN. Again, the PRC is compensating for this
weakness by importing up-to-date equipment from Russia, notably the Su-27
and Su-30. The PRC also is developing the ability to produce at least the
Su-27 in its own factories.22 Nevertheless, to quote analysts Bernard D. Cole
and Paul H. B. Godwin, “By the time China is capable of producing Su-27s
without Russian assistance, it is likely that Harlan Jencks’ assessment, made
in the late 1970s, that China’s J-6/MiG-19 was ‘the most highly perfected obsolescent combat aircraft in the world’ will yet again apply.”23
PRC air forces have a poor reputation for maintenance, logistics, and
24
training. The PRC is beginning to develop aerial refueling capabilities, but
most of its planes remain tied to their bases in mainland China.25 Russia has offered to lease the PRC a trio of Airborne Early Warning aircraft and to train
Chinese aircrews to operate them.26 Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that PRC
commanders suffer from serious handicaps in both their ability to monitor the
skies and their ability to coordinate operations by their own aircraft.
The pilots who fly Beijing’s Su-27s and Su-30s tend to have approximately 180 hours of flying time. This exceeds the 150 hours typical in Japan
and puts these Chinese pilots on a par with their counterparts in India and the
ROC. US fighter pilots typically have 205 hours of experience or more. Chi104
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nese pilots who fly the PRC’s older aircraft, however, tend to have only about
130 hours or less.27
The PRC currently has 128 Su-27s and Su-30s. The rest of its air armada, totaling more than 2,000 planes, consists of inferior aircraft flown by
relatively inexperienced pilots and generally confined to operations within
unrefueled flight range of their bases. Japan, by contrast, has 360 combat aircraft, including 130 F-15s. The ROC has 511, including 57 Mirage-2000s and
146 F-16s. India has 736, including 20 Sea Harriers, 28 Su-30s, 228 MiG-29s,
and 40 Mirage-2000s.28 The US Navy deploys 50 modern tactical aircraft on a
single aircraft carrier, and typically maintains four such vessels in the Pacific
Ocean at any given time.29
The PRC is improving all of its forces. PRC defense budgets are difficult for outsiders to analyze, and it is difficult to tell how much of an effort
Beijing is making, or how much faster it could modernize its forces if it chose
to do so.30 One must assume, however, that the PRC is spending as much as its
leaders consider desirable. From the 1980s onward, the Chinese government
has been attempting to reduce the burden that defense spending imposes on its
overall economy.
Beijing may hope that should it go to war, it will be able to call on assistance from various allies. Pakistan, for instance, might well support the
PRC against India. Beijing is deepening its ties with Moscow, and Russia and
the PRC are holding joint exercises, which will make it easier for their armed
forces to cooperate.31
Despite the PLA’s shortcomings, the PRC’s forces are formidable,
and Beijing is making substantial progress toward improving them. Beijing
can and does intimidate the smaller Asian nations. Nevertheless, the PRC
could not fight its major Asian rivals with any guarantee of success. In the
same vein, the PRC could not refuse an ultimatum from Russia or the United
States without taking an enormous gamble. These uncertainties undermine
Beijing’s ability both to apply and to resist pressure in international politics.
Nuclear weapons allow the PRC to take diplomatic and military positions with a much greater level of confidence. Beijing can be certain that
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even the United States will proceed with caution against a nuclear-armed opponent. In the event—however remote the possibility—that PRC leaders
should ever find it expedient to use tactical nuclear munitions in combat, such
weapons also ensure that the PLA will be able to strike crippling blows
against even the strongest opponents. The PRC’s nuclear arsenal also helps to
prevent other powers from using or threatening to use their own nuclear
weapons against China. Moreover, despite the PRC’s technological and economic difficulties, Beijing is equipped to build nuclear weapons and delivery
systems capable of performing all these functions at relatively little cost.

China’s Nuclear Doctrine
In principle, nuclear weapons provide an excellent backstop for the
PRC’s national strategy. Beijing, however, denies seeing nuclear weapons in
those terms. According to the PRC’s national defense White Paper of 2002:
China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and
adopts an extremely restrained attitude toward the development of nuclear
weapons. China has never participated in any nuclear arms race and never deployed nuclear weapons abroad. China’s limited nuclear counterattack ability
is entirely for deterrence against possible nuclear attacks by other countries.32

When Mao Zedong initially called on his people to develop nuclear
weapons, he did, indeed, seem to be thinking primarily in terms of countering
the nuclear forces of others. “We also need the atom bomb,” Mao stated in
1956. “If our nation does not want to be intimidated, we have to have this
thing.”33 Mao was not, however, squeamish about what nuclear weapons can
do. When the Italian communist leader Palmiro Togliatti confided his fear
that the Cold War might end in the nuclear destruction of Europe, Mao responded, “Who said Europe should survive?”34
PRC officials continue to hint that their view of nuclear weapons is
more pragmatic than documents like the White Paper might imply. According
to one report, which may well be apocryphal, a PRC military officer once
warned his American counterpart, “In the end you care a lot more about Los
Angeles than you do about Taipei.”35 Chinese military writings discuss the role
of nuclear arms in deterring foreign threats, but they also portray these weapons as tools which the PRC might use to achieve strategic objectives of its own.
Major General Yang Huan, for instance, advocates research to make
nuclear weapons more useful in “actual fighting.”36 One can interpret this remark in a variety of ways. Even a commander who is solely interested in preventing enemy attacks may want to improve his ability to fight a genuine
engagement in order to improve the credibility of his deterrent threat. Nevertheless, Yang’s choice of words seems significant.
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Another PLA officer, Major General Wu Jianguo, has explicitly
stated that his country may find nuclear weapons useful in local wars.37 Wu
claims that Britain, America, and the Soviet Union used nuclear weapons to
improve their positions in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet
dispute, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War:
These countries threatened to use nuclear weapons in conventional wars because they believed that with nuclear weapons in hand, psychologically they
would be able to hold a dominant position which would enhance troop morale
and frighten the enemy on the one hand, and restrict the enemy’s use of some
conventional means on the other, thus changing the direction of the war.38

The PRC, Wu suggests, must emulate the other nuclear powers.
Throughout the 1990s, Beijing timed test firings of nuclear-capable missiles to
signal its displeasure with various American foreign policy decisions and Taiwanese election results.39 This suggests that the PRC’s leaders are willing to take
Wu’s advice. Wu goes on to argue that if the PRC cannot achieve its objectives
through purely psychological means, it must “strive to win a victory through actual combat, so as to remove obstacles to its political, economic, and diplomatic
activities. Militarily, the immense effect of nuclear weaponry is that it can serve
as a deterrent force and, at the same time, as a means of actual combat.”40
Wu rejects the idea that any form of combat, including nuclear warfare, is inherently taboo. “We are materialists,” he says, “so when we study an
issue, we must proceed from objective reality rather than from a subjective
wish, and, through investigation and study of objective reality, we derive our
principles, policies, and measures.”41

Capabilities and Continuities
The PRC has been developing the kind of capabilities commanders
such as Yang and Wu advocate. By US and Russian standards, Beijing’s known
nuclear arsenal appears small. Nevertheless, as the bumper sticker would have
it, one atomic bomb can ruin your whole day. Although the PRC does not appear to have deployed large numbers of warheads, it has continually developed
its capacity to wage nuclear war.
Even before the PRC detonated its first atomic bomb, Chinese engineers were designing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).42 Beijing
developed a functioning ICBM in the 1970s and deployed it in 1981. Initial
versions of this missile, which was known as the DF-5, were unwieldy. Although the DF-5’s 10,000- to 12,000-kilometer range allows it to hit the western United States, the missile uses liquid fuel and cannot be stored in its
launch position. Some believe that the Chinese also stored the warheads separately from their launch vehicles.
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Analysts estimate that launch crews would have required two hours
to prepare early models of the DF-5 for launch. This made the DF-5 vulnerable to a first strike by enemy missiles. The PRC compensated for this vulnerability by concealing its missiles in mountains, beneath forest canopies, and
underground.43 Some of the tunnel complexes housing Chinese ICBM sites
extended for thousands of kilometers. Beijing also constructed many dummy
missile sites to divert attention from the real ones.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the PRC improved the range, accuracy,
and readiness of the DF-5. Analysts believe current models have a range of
more than 13,000 kilometers, a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 500 to 3,500
meters, and can be ready for launch in 30 to 60 minutes. In 1992, Western
analysts believed the PRC had four DF-5s on alert.44 Three years later, the
PRC had increased its arsenal to an estimated 8 to 11. As of 2003, at least 20
DF-5s are in service.
Meanwhile, the PRC has developed a solid-fueled missile known as
the DF-31, which has a CEP of 300 to 500 meters.45 Not only can the DF-31 be
ready for launch in 15 minutes, it is fully road-mobile, and analysts expect future versions to be able to travel cross-country as well. This missile’s only
significant handicap appears to be its 3,000- to 8,000-kilometer range, which
allows it to hit America’s Pacific Northwest, but nothing south or east of that.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies indicates that the first DF-31
brigade became operational in 2002-03. Chinese engineers are working actively on an even more advanced design, the DF-41, which should have a
longer range and a launch time of three to five minutes.
The Chinese also have developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and a nuclear-powered submarine to carry them. This submarine, the Xia, was out of service for the latter part of the 1990s, but may now be
operational again.46 The PRC is working on more advanced designs for both
submarines and submarine-fired missiles.47 Western analysts remain uncertain how quickly these projects are progressing. The PRC reportedly plans to
build between four and six of the new submarines.48
Although a Chinese space launch in the 1970s indicated that the
PRC had developed the technology to build Multiple Independently-targeted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), no Chinese missiles currently carry more than
one warhead. The reason remains open for speculation. Beijing has had difficulty reducing the size of its warheads, and may find it difficult to build MIRV
systems that are light enough for its missiles to carry.49 Alternatively, the PRC
may simply prefer not to risk more than one valuable warhead on a single delivery system.
Beijing has attracted useful media attention by threatening to deploy
MIRVs if the United States continues to develop its National Missile Defense
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(NMD) system, and the PRC’s leaders may feel that they currently have more
to gain by threatening to MIRV than by actually making good on the threat.
The PRC has begun to develop other ways of defeating NMD as well. Chinese
engineers have begun work on decoys and maneuverable warheads. Beijing
also is investigating the possibility of electronically jamming NMD radar
systems, and of using anti-radiation missiles to destroy such radars outright.50
In addition to its ICBMs and SLBMs, Beijing has a minimum of several hundred other nuclear devices.51 Many may be mounted on the PRC’s
short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which are capable of carrying either nuclear or non-nuclear warheads. The PRC built hundreds of these
weapons in the late 1990s, and plans to build hundreds more in the first decade of the 21st century.52 As they did with their ICBMs, PRC designers have
replaced liquid-fueled designs with more accurate, solid-fueled missiles capable of launching on short notice.
Both the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN have bombers capable
of dropping free-fall nuclear bombs.53 The US Department of Defense suggests
that the PRC will soon deploy nuclear-capable cruise missiles for launch from
ships and aircraft.54 Civilian analysts have reported that the PRC already has
such missiles.55 The PRC also is making progress on radar-absorbent materials
to make both cruise missiles and the aircraft that launch them less vulnerable to
air defenses.56
The PRC could use both short-range missiles and aircraft to support
its non-nuclear forces in combat operations. Western observers disagree over
the question of whether or not Beijing deploys purpose-built tactical nuclear
weapons. More cautious analysts warn that due to Chinese secrecy and deception, it is impossible for outsiders to be certain whether the PRC has such devices.57 PLA units, however, have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons in
exercises. Many analysts suggest that the PRC has nuclear artillery shells,
nuclear-tipped rockets, and nuclear demolition mines. The authoritative Jane’s
publications indicate that the PRC also has nuclear mines for use at sea, nuclear
torpedoes, nuclear depth charges, and nuclear anti-ship missiles.58
The PRC, as noted, remains weak in C4I2 technology. Nevertheless,
it has made the command of its nuclear forces a top priority, and it has used the
most advanced capabilities at its disposal to ensure that its military leaders
will be able to use their nuclear forces in a timely, flexible, and controlled
fashion, even under enemy attack. The PRC has situated its nuclear command
posts deep underground. Key bases also benefit from a well-developed air defense system. The PRC’s SA-12 surface-to-air missile system has a limited
ability to shoot down short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.59
The PRC’s nuclear command posts can communicate over dedicated
wire and fiber-optic communications lines.60 Although nuclear commanders
Winter 2003-04
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would not depend on China’s civilian telecommunications network, they
would almost certainly be able to use it to supplement their own systems.
Commanders also would have access to wireless microwave and satellite
communications networks. Although enemy forces could degrade the Chinese high command’s communication capabilities, they would find it nearly
impossible to shut them down entirely.
The PRC’s communications system does, however, depend mainly on
commercially available technology. China’s network lacks modern automation and is slower than comparable Western systems. The PRC has, however,
automated the communications nodes associated with its air and missile defenses. If Beijing has not yet automated the systems that allow national authorities to control ICBM forces, one may safely assume that it will do so soon.
Not only has the PRC been improving its nuclear capabilities for as
long as it has had them, its military authorities have declared their intention to
continue improvements. In 1993, the PLA General Staff Department (GSD)
formally announced its desire to develop new generations of both tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons.61 Although the PRC has made progress, many of
the GSD’s specific objectives remain to be realized, and therefore it seems
safe to assume that the buildup will continue.62 The PRC has the infrastructure
to continue developing its arsenal. US Department of Defense estimates suggest that the PRC can produce between 10 and 12 ICBMs per year, deploy as
many as 1,000 new short-range missiles by the end of the decade, and triple its
stockpile of nuclear warheads, all without significant new investment.63
In March 2003, the Chinese politician Hu Jintao became President of
the PRC. Hu already had become General Secretary of China’s Communist
Party in November 2002. This leadership change appears unlikely to signal any
significant changes in the PRC’s national strategy. Jiang Zemin, the former
President, has retained control of the Central Military Commission, and Jiang’s
associates hold other key positions in the new government.64 Hu achieved his
position largely by developing a reputation as a political conservative.65
Reports indicate that Hu is inclined to follow his predecessors’ guidance on international issues. Meanwhile, PRC media sources maintain that
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the global political environment remains largely the same as it has been for
decades. To writers in Beijing Review, even the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of preventive attack is “just old wine in a new bottle.”66 The PRC’s nuclear policy has remained consistent for close to 40 years.
If PRC leaders do not feel that their external environment has changed, they
have few reasons to change that policy.

Conclusion
Chinese authorities are undoubtedly as sincere as any other world
leaders when they call for arms control and disarmament. Nevertheless, as
long as nuclear weapons remain a fixture of international politics, one must
assume that the PRC will attempt to extract the maximum possible advantage
from its nuclear capabilities. Although Beijing may adjust its programs to account for its integration into global economic regimes, America’s decision to
deploy missile defenses, and similar issues, only an event of epochal proportions is likely to change the overall direction of its policy. Others must make
their own plans accordingly.
Not only are Beijing’s policies important to East Asian affairs, they
invite us to think more creatively about the general significance of nuclear
weapons in international relations. The Cold War habituated us to seeing nuclear strategy in terms of perilous standoffs between powerful states. In such
standoffs, popular wisdom tells us, both sides have as their primary aim the
deterrence of war.67 Since 1991, it has seemed easy to relegate Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to history. This has led observers to focus on the
possibility that rogues of one sort or another might use weapons of mass destruction in isolated acts of carnage.
The PRC is not, happily, engaged in any standoff to match the intensity of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it uses its nuclear arsenal to influence its
relations with potential opponents in a wide variety of situations. Others have
sought to emulate Beijing—India, for instance, began its own nuclear weapons program at least partly to protect itself from Chinese pressure.68 The nuclear statecraft of contemporary Asia lacks the apocalyptic overtones of
MAD, and it is more difficult to isolate from other aspects of international relations. One must conceive of it, to paraphrase Clausewitz, as a continuation
of politics with the admixture of other means, and as more countries develop
nuclear weapons, this approach to nuclear policy may grow increasingly
common.
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